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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
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______ 
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______ 
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                               Appellant 
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CUMBERLAND COUNTY; GLENN SANDERS, both 
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Cumberland County Correctional Facility; CORRECTIONS 
OFFICER MARTINEZ, both individually and in his official 
capacity as a Correctional Officer; JOHN DOES 1-10, sued in 
their individual and official capacities; LIEUTENANT 
MICHAEL PALAU, both Individually and in his official 
capacity as a Policy Maker of Cumberland County Jail; 
CAPTAIN KENNETH LANCKEN, both individually and in 
his official capacity as Policy Maker of Cumberland County  
Jail; CORRECTIONAL OFFICER JAMES H. WILDE, III  
 both individually and in his official Capacity as Correctional 
Officer 
______ 
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On Appeal from the United States  District Court for the 
District of New Jersey 
(D. N.J. No. 1-09-cv-01323) 
District Judge:  Honorable Jerome B. Simandle 
______ 
 
Argued October 30, 2013 
Before:  FISHER, JORDAN and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges. 
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Lauren Plevinsky, Esq. 
William A. Riback, Esq.    ARGUED 
132 North Haddon Avenue 
Haddonfield, NJ 08033 
 
Steven L. Rothman, Esq.    ARGUED 
Lipman, Antonelli, Batt, Dunlap, Wodlinger & Gilson 
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FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
  
 Lawrence Thomas brought this suit under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 and the New Jersey Civil Rights Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§ 10:6-2, after he sustained an attack at the hands of other 
inmates at the Cumberland County Correctional Facility (the 
“CCCF”).  The attack occurred after a several-minute long 
verbal argument between Thomas and a group of inmates in 
the presence of corrections officers.  Thomas brought suit 
against Cumberland County and policymakers at the prison 
(together, the “County”) for, among other things, their failure 
to properly train corrections officers in conflict de-escalation 
and intervention techniques.  The District Court granted 
summary judgment in the County’s favor on Thomas’s 
failure-to-train claim.  For the reasons that follow, we will 
vacate the District Court’s order.   
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I. 
A. 
 Lawrence Thomas entered Cumberland County’s 
custody on June 4, 2008.1  He was confined in the CCCF 
pending trial for shoplifting and failing to pay fines that he 
had incurred.  He was assigned to the “D-Pod,” a group of 
holding cells in the CCCF.  The D-Pod is relatively small, 
housing only around 100 detainees.  It has two levels, and the 
upper level is open to the lower level with stairs that connect 
the two.  It houses minimum and medium security detainees.  
Thomas was a minimum security detainee. 
 The CCCF is considered a tough prison, due in large 
part to gang activity.  At least four or five fights are seen and 
reported every day, and up to twenty or thirty are estimated to 
be unseen and unreported.  The County knew of these 
conditions by way of incident reports filed for the fights that 
are seen and reported.    
 During his detention, Thomas developed a reputation 
as a bully.  He was known for stealing others’ food.  This suit 
concerns Thomas’s conflict with a group of inmates in the D-
Pod, which occurred on July 27, 2008.  Two corrections 
officers were on duty in the D-Pod that day – Corrections 
Officer Fernando Martinez (“Officer Martinez”) and 
Corrections Officer James Wilde (“Officer Wilde”).  Thomas 
                                              
1 This account of the facts derives from evidence in the 
summary judgment record and construes the evidence in the 
light most favorable to Thomas. 
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claims he was “bartering” for food,2 and after acquiring rice 
and soup, he left his cell to microwave the food.  When he 
exited, he found that a crowd of about twelve inmates had 
gathered outside of his cell.  Officer Martinez was also among 
the crowd.  The inmates were angry with Thomas, believing 
that he had stolen food.   
 The argument, which began outside of Thomas’s cell 
on the upper level of the D-Pod, grew into a heated verbal 
dispute that lasted for several minutes.  Throughout the 
argument, Officer Martinez was with the crowd while Officer 
Wilde was at his desk on the lower level of the D-Pod.  At 
some point, Officer Martinez said something along the lines 
of, “If you guys don’t fight or break it up, I’m going to lock 
everybody down.”  (PA 91, 154).  In response to this 
statement, the crowd of inmates laughed.  The statement did 
not cause the crowd to disperse. 
 While Thomas, Officer Martinez, and the crowd were 
on the upper level, another inmate, Leonardo Santiago, yelled 
from the lower level, “If you want to take stuff from people, 
come down here and take stuff from me.”  (PA 120, 150).  At 
this time, Thomas began to make his way downstairs to the 
lower level, allegedly to seek the protection of Officer 
                                              
2 Thomas states that he was “bartering” – he was 
borrowing food and would pay it back with double the 
amount on commissary day.  Other inmates described his 
actions as stealing. 
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Wilde.3  As he headed down, other inmates started yelling 
explicit threats of violence at Thomas, both from the lower 
level and from the crowd behind him on the stairs and on the 
upper level. 
 Thomas stated that when he reached the lower level, 
the crowd was blocking his path to Officer Wilde’s desk.  He 
moved towards Santiago’s cell.  Within fifteen or twenty 
seconds after Thomas reached the lower level, Santiago 
struck Thomas.  Santiago stated that he struck Thomas 
partially in self-defense, because Thomas was approaching 
him in a threatening manner.  Officer Martinez attempted to 
restrain Santiago, but at this time, another inmate, Michael 
Cruz, struck Thomas twice.  When Thomas was injured, 
Officer Martinez was immediately next to him.  Officer 
Martinez yelled for everyone to lock down, and the inmates 
reluctantly complied.  The total time that elapsed between the 
beginning of the argument on the upper level and the violence 
that erupted on the lower level was three or four minutes. 
 Neither Officer Martinez nor Officer Wilde took any 
action to quell the unrest as the argument progressed.  One 
inmate testified that he could tell that a fight was imminent 
and wanted to see a fight happen.  Other inmates stated that 
the officers could and should have stopped the argument 
before the violence occurred.  Officer Martinez 
acknowledged that he saw the entire incident.  Thomas 
suffered a serious eye injury and a concussion.  He was left 
with no sight in one eye. 
                                              
3 Other inmates stated that Thomas was heading 
downstairs in an aggressive manner to confront Santiago.  
Thomas, by contrast, maintained that he was heading down to 
the lower level in order to reach and seek protection from 
Officer Wilde. 
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 In New Jersey, new corrections officers must complete 
pre-service training and Academy training.  The CCCF 
provides a three-week pre-service training program with 
materials from the state.  New corrections officers are 
required to complete this program prior to assuming their 
duties.  A corrections officer must then complete state-
provided Academy training within the first twelve to eighteen 
months of employment.  The CCCF does not, as a part of its 
pre-service training, include training on de-escalating or 
intervening in conflicts before violence occurs.  The officers 
do not receive specific training on calling for back-up; 
instead, they must use their discretion based on the training 
that they do receive.  Both Officer Martinez and Officer 
Wilde had completed pre-service training, but because they 
had been working at the CCCF for less than one year, they 
had not yet completed Academy training. 
 Thomas obtained an expert report from Dr. Richard 
Kiekbusch regarding the need for de-escalation and 
intervention training and the failure to intervene in this 
situation.  Dr. Kiekbusch, a professor of criminology, has 
over twenty years of experience in correctional 
administration.  Dr. Kiekbusch reviewed materials in the 
summary judgment record and also relied on materials on 
national standards for prison training, with which he was 
familiar.  He observed that the CCCF does not have any 
training on defusing a volatile situation with an inmate, de-
escalating inmate tension, intervening in situations of inmate 
unrest, or calling for back-up when control requires additional 
personnel.  He explained that prison training programs across 
the country proactively address the use of intervention and 
de-escalation skills and calling for back-up to defuse inmate 
tension and unrest. 
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 Dr. Kiekbusch observed that the CCCF administration 
“failed to provide pre-service training to its correctional 
officers regarding the de-escalation of inmate tension and 
unrest and calling for back-up in situations in which 
maintaining control of the inmates under their supervision has 
exceeded, or is likely to exceed, the capabilities of those 
officers.”  (PA 56).  He concluded that Officer Martinez 
failed to intervene in the rising inmate tension or call for 
back-up to help quell the argument and that Officer 
Martinez’s failure to intervene contributed to the injuries that 
Thomas sustained.  Based upon his education, training, and 
experience in jail management, Dr. Kiekbusch found that the 
CCCF’s failure to provide training on de-escalation, 
intervention, and when to call for back-up “to be a careless 
and dangerous practice, and one which reflects a deliberate 
indifference to inmate health and safety.”  (PA 61). 
B. 
 Thomas filed a complaint in the United States District 
Court for the District of New Jersey.  He later filed a second 
amended complaint that included claims under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 and the New Jersey Civil Rights Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§ 10:6-2.  The complaint named Cumberland County and 
policymakers at the prison along with Officers Martinez and 
Wilde as defendants.   
 On April 5, 2011, all defendants filed a motion for 
summary judgment and a motion to exclude the expert 
testimony of Dr. Kiekbusch.  The District Court granted 
summary judgment on all claims against the County and 
Officer Wilde.  It denied summary judgment with respect to 
Thomas’s claims against Officer Martinez for failure to 
protect, failure to intervene, and incitement.  It also denied the 
motion to exclude Dr. Kiekbusch’s expert testimony. 
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 Thomas’s claims against Officer Martinez proceeded 
to trial.  The jury found in favor of Officer Martinez, 
concluding that he was aware of the danger that Thomas 
faced, but was not willfully indifferent.  The District Court 
entered final judgment and Thomas filed a timely notice of 
appeal.  Thomas appeals only the District Court’s grant of 
summary judgment in the County’s favor on the section 1983 
failure-to-train claim. 
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331.  This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291. 
 “We review the District Court’s disposition of a 
summary judgment motion de novo, applying the same 
standard as the District Court.”  Doe v. Luzerne Cnty., 660 
F.3d 169, 174 (3d Cir. 2011).  Summary judgment is proper 
“if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to 
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  “An issue is genuine 
only if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis on which a 
reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party, and a 
factual dispute is material only if it might affect the outcome 
of the suit under governing law.”  Kaucher v. Cnty. of Bucks, 
455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Anderson v. Liberty 
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).  In conducting our 
review, we view the record in the light most favorable to the 
non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that 
party’s favor.  Bowers v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 475 
F.3d 524, 535 (3d Cir. 2007).  A motion for summary 
judgment is properly denied if “a fair-minded jury could 
return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented.”  
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. 
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III. 
 The sole issue on appeal is the County’s municipal 
liability under section 1983 for its failure to provide pre-
service training on conflict de-escalation and intervention 
techniques.  A municipality cannot be held liable for the 
unconstitutional acts of its employees on a theory of 
respondeat superior.  Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 
658, 691 (1978).  A plaintiff seeking to hold a municipality 
liable under section 1983 must demonstrate that the violation 
of rights was caused by the municipality’s policy or custom.  
Id. at 690-91.  Liability is imposed “when the policy or 
custom itself violates the Constitution or when the policy or 
custom, while not unconstitutional itself, is the ‘moving 
force’ behind the constitutional tort of one of its employees.”  
Colburn v. Upper Darby Twp., 946 F.2d 1017, 1027 (3d Cir. 
1991) (quoting Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326 
(1981)).   
 Where the policy “concerns a failure to train or 
supervise municipal employees, liability under section 1983 
requires a showing that the failure amounts to ‘deliberate 
indifference’ to the rights of persons with whom those 
employees will come into contact.”  Carter v. City of Phila., 
181 F.3d 339, 357 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting City of Canton, 
Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989) (“Canton”)).  
Additionally, “the identified deficiency in a city’s training 
program must be closely related to the ultimate injury;” or in 
other words, “the deficiency in training [must have] actually 
caused” the constitutional violation.  Canton, 489 U.S. at 391. 
 The parties do not challenge the existence of a policy 
or of a constitutional violation on appeal.  The relevant policy 
for the purposes of municipal liability is the County’s 
decision not to provide conflict de-escalation and intervention 
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training as a part of pre-service training for corrections 
officers.  The alleged constitutional violation stems from the 
officers’ failure to “take reasonable measures to protect 
prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners.”4  
Hamilton v. Leavy, 117 F.3d 742, 746 (3d Cir. 1997) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  We will focus on whether the 
failure to provide pre-service training on conflict de-
escalation and intervention amounts to deliberate 
indifference, and whether this deficiency in training caused 
Thomas’s injury. 
A. 
 “‘[D]eliberate indifference’ is a stringent standard of 
fault, requiring proof that a municipal actor disregarded a 
known or obvious consequence of his action.”  Bd. of Cnty. 
                                              
4 This duty to protect a prisoner from other prisoners 
has been read as a limitation on punishment from the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment.  Hamilton v. Leavy, 117 F.3d 742, 746 (3d Cir. 
1997).  As a pretrial detainee, Thomas is not subject to the 
Eighth Amendment’s protections; rather, the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause governs.  A.M. ex rel. 
J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cnty. Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 579 
(3d Cir. 2004).  This Court has applied the same standard to a 
failure-to-protect claim under the Fourteenth Amendment as 
under the Eighth Amendment.  Id.  A prisoner has a valid 
failure-to-protect claim if the prison official shows 
“‘deliberate indifference’ to a substantial risk of serious harm 
to an inmate.”  Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994).  
Officer Martinez’s failure to protect Thomas, on which the 
District Court denied summary judgment, is therefore the 
relevant constitutional injury for the purposes of the County’s 
municipal liability. 
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Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410 
(1997) (“Bryan Cnty.”).  Ordinarily, “[a] pattern of similar 
constitutional violations by untrained employees” is 
necessary “to demonstrate deliberate indifference for 
purposes of failure to train.”  Connick v. Thompson, -- U.S. --, 
--, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1360 (2011).  “Without notice that a 
course of training is deficient in a particular respect, 
decisionmakers can hardly be said to have deliberately chosen 
a training program that will cause violations of constitutional 
rights.”  Id.  A pattern of violations puts municipal 
decisionmakers on notice that a new program is necessary, 
and “[t]heir continued adherence to an approach that they 
know or should know has failed to prevent tortious conduct 
by employees may establish the conscious disregard for the 
consequences of their action – the ‘deliberate indifference’ – 
necessary to trigger municipal liability.”  Bryan Cnty., 520 
U.S. at 407. 
 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court posited in Canton 
that in certain situations, the need for training “can be said to 
be ‘so obvious,’ that failure to do so could properly be 
characterized as ‘deliberate indifference’ to constitutional 
rights” even without a pattern of constitutional violations.  
489 U.S. at 390 n.10.  The Court offered a hypothetical 
example of this “single-incident” failure-to-train liability.  
Because “city policymakers know to a moral certainty that 
their police officers will be required to arrest fleeing felons,” 
if the city arms the officers with firearms, “the need to train 
officers in the constitutional limitations on the use of deadly 
force” is “so obvious” that a failure to provide such training 
could provide a basis for single-incident municipal liability.  
Id.  Liability in single-incident cases depends on “[t]he 
likelihood that the situation will recur and the predictability 
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that an officer lacking specific tools to handle that situation 
will violate citizens’ rights.”  Bryan Cnty., 520 U.S. at 409. 
 The Supreme Court recently examined the 
applicability of single-incident liability in Connick v. 
Thompson, where an exonerated convict sought to hold the 
New Orleans District Attorney liable for failing to train 
prosecutors on discovery disclosure obligations under Brady 
v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), with respect to the specific 
types of evidence in his case.  Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1355.  In 
finding that the failure to train did not “fall within the narrow 
range of Canton’s hypothesized single-incident liability,” 
Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1361, the Court highlighted 
prosecutors’ legal training and professional obligations, 
which differentiate them from other public employees.  Id. at 
1361-63.  Unlike armed police officers who “must sometimes 
make split-second decisions with life-or-death consequences” 
and have no reason to be “familiar with the constitutional 
constraints on the use of deadly force,” id. at 1361, 
“[p]rosecutors are not only equipped but are also ethically 
bound to know what Brady entails and to perform legal 
research when they are uncertain,” id. at 1363.  “In light of 
this regime of legal training and professional responsibility, 
recurring constitutional violations are not the ‘obvious 
consequence’ of failing to provide prosecutors with formal in-
house training about how to obey the law.”  Id. (quoting 
Bryan Cnty., 520 U.S. at 409).  The Court also differentiated 
the situation from the example in Canton due to “the nuance 
of the allegedly necessary training.”  Id.  Because prosecutors 
were familiar with the general Brady rule, Thompson’s claim 
relied on a failure to train “about particular Brady evidence or 
the specific scenario related to the violation in his case,” and 
“[t]hat sort of nuance simply cannot support an inference of 
deliberate indifference.”  Id. 
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 We have previously found that a single-incident 
constitutional violation was sufficient to preclude summary 
judgment on a failure-to-train claim against a municipality.  
In Berg v. County of Allegheny, the plaintiff was wrongly 
arrested pursuant to a warrant that was erroneously issued 
when a clerk transposed two numbers.  219 F.3d 261, 266 (3d 
Cir. 2000).  The plaintiff sought to hold the county liable for 
its poor training procedures on the warrant-creation process.  
Id. at 275.  We held that summary judgment was not 
appropriate, because “[h]aving employed a design where the 
slip of a finger could result in wrongful arrest and 
imprisonment, there remains an issue of fact whether the 
County was deliberately indifferent to an obvious risk.”  Id. at 
277.  The failure to provide protective measures and training 
to prevent the mistake was “comparable to ‘a failure to equip 
law enforcement officers with specific tools to handle 
recurring situations.’”  Id. (quoting Bryan Cnty., 520 U.S. at 
409). 
 We have also previously addressed a failure-to-train 
case involving the need for conflict de-escalation training.  In 
A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne County Juvenile Detention 
Center, a child confined in a juvenile facility who was 
physically assaulted by other residents sought to hold the 
facility liable for its lack of training on conflict de-escalation 
and management of youth behavior.  372 F.3d 572, 575, 580 
(3d Cir. 2004).  The facility had offered no training on de-
escalating conflicts or identifying children who could be 
victimized by others.  Id.  The plaintiff presented expert 
opinion evidence that the training program was not adequate 
and did not meet nationally recognized standards.  Id. at 582.  
We observed that “the evidence supports an inference that the 
potential for conflict between residents of the Center was 
high” and concluded that “the evidence concerning the 
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Center’s failure to train its child-care workers in areas that 
would reduce the risk of a resident being deprived of his 
constitutional right to security and well-being was sufficient 
to prevent the grant of summary judgment.”  Id. at 583.   
 Thomas advances a single-incident theory of liability, 
arguing that a jury could find that the CCCF was deliberately 
indifferent “when ‘patently obvious’ standards, widely-
accepted national standard[s] and training relevant to inmate 
safety were disregarded, at the same time their Corrections 
Officers were confronting a combustible jail.”  (Appellant’s 
Br., at 10).  To find deliberate indifference from a single-
incident violation, the risk of Thomas’s injury must be a 
“highly predictable consequence” of the CCCF’s failure to 
provide de-escalation and intervention training as a part of 
pre-service training for corrections officers.  Connick, 131 S. 
Ct. at 1361.   
 Thomas put forward evidence that fights regularly 
occurred in the prison.  While these fights are not sufficient to 
create a pattern of violations, because there is scant evidence 
that they resulted in constitutional violations, they are 
relevant to whether his injury was a “highly predictable 
consequence” of the failure to train on de-escalation 
techniques for single-incident liability.  A reasonable jury 
could conclude based on the frequency of fights and the 
volatile nature of the prison that the “predictability that an 
officer lacking [de-escalation and intervention training] to 
handle that situation will violate rights” and the “likelihood 
that the situation will recur” demonstrate deliberate 
indifference on the County’s part.  Bryan Cnty., 520 U.S. at 
409.  Thomas also provided expert opinion evidence that the 
failure to provide conflict de-escalation and intervention 
training was a careless and dangerous practice not aligned 
with prevailing standards.  Viewing the evidence in the 
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record, including Dr. Kiekbusch’s expert opinion, in the light 
most favorable to Thomas, a reasonable jury could find that 
the County acted with deliberate indifference.  
 Thomas’s case for single-incident liability falls 
somewhere between the plainly obvious need to train armed 
police officers “in the constitutional limitations on the use of 
deadly force” in Canton, 489 U.S. at 390 n.10, and the lack of 
such an obvious need in Connick, where prosecutors had a 
legal education and ethical obligations and the allegedly 
necessary training was nuanced, 131 S. Ct. at 1363.  
However, the case here is more similar to the hypothetical in 
Canton than to the situation in Connick.  Like the police 
officers in Canton, corrections officers have no reason to 
know how or when to de-escalate a conflict to avoid a 
constitutional violation for failure to protect.  Given the 
frequency of fights occurring between inmates in the CCCF 
that could lead to constitutional violations for failure to 
protect, the lack of training here is akin to “a failure to equip 
law enforcement officers with specific tools to handle 
recurring situations.”  Bryan Cnty., 520 U.S. at 409 
(discussing the single-incident hypothetical in Canton, 489 
U.S. at 390 n.10).  
 In contrast to Connick, the officers here have no reason 
to have an independent education, knowledge base, or ethical 
duty that would prepare them to handle the volatile conflicts 
that might lead to inmate-on-inmate violence.  Also unlike in 
Connick, there is no nuance to the training Thomas seeks to 
require.  While the prosecutors in Connick had some 
knowledge of Brady’s requirements, corrections officers had 
no de-escalation or intervention training as a part of their pre-
service training. 
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 Thomas’s case is not precisely analogous to either 
Berg or A.M. ex rel. J.M.K., but there are enough similarities 
such that the District Court should not have precluded the 
factual issues underlying the deliberate indifference 
determination from going to a jury.  Like in Berg, the County 
“fail[ed] to provide protective measures and fail safes” to 
prevent mistakes in a situation that occurs frequently.  219 
F.3d at 277.  And similar to A.M. ex rel. J.M.K., the potential 
for conflict was high and there was a complete lack of 
training on de-escalation and intervention.  While the juvenile 
facility and the series of assaults on the plaintiff in A.M. ex 
rel. J.M.K. differentiate it from this case, these differences do 
not justify discounting factual issues to conclude that the 
County was not deliberately indifferent as a matter of law.  
We therefore hold that there was sufficient evidence for the 
question of whether the County acted with deliberate 
indifference to survive summary judgment and proceed to a 
jury. 
B. 
 In addition to deliberate indifference, “City of Canton 
teaches that to sustain a claim based on a failure to train 
theory, ‘the identified deficiency in [the] training program 
must be closely related to the ultimate [constitutional] 
injury.’”  Colburn, 946 F.2d at 1028 (alterations in original) 
(quoting Canton, 489 U.S. at 391).  The failure to train must 
have “a causal nexus with [the plaintiff’s] injury.”  Id. at 
1030.  In analyzing causation, “the focus must be on 
adequacy of the training program in relation to the tasks the 
particular officers must perform.”  Canton, 489 U.S. at 390.  
Liability cannot rest only on a showing that the employees 
“could have been better trained or that additional training was 
available that would have reduced the overall risk of 
constitutional injury.”  Colburn, 946 F.2d at 1029-30.  Rather, 
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the causation inquiry focuses on whether “the injury [could] 
have been avoided had the employee been trained under a 
program that was not deficient in the identified respect.”  
Canton, 489 U.S. at 391. 
 Causation is a requirement for failure-to-train liability 
that is separate from deliberate indifference; however, “[t]he 
high degree of predictability [in a single-incident case] may 
also support an inference of causation – that the 
municipality’s indifference led directly to the very 
consequence that was so predictable.”  Bryan Cnty., 520 U.S. 
at 409-10.  The causation inquiry – “[p]redicting how a 
hypothetically well-trained officer would have acted under 
the circumstances” – “may not be an easy task for the 
factfinder, particularly since matters of judgment may be 
involved.”  Canton, 489 U.S. at 391.  Nonetheless, “judge and 
jury, doing their respective jobs, will be adequate to the task.”  
Id. 
 Thomas put forward evidence from Santiago – the first 
inmate who struck Thomas – that the officers could have 
stopped the argument before violence broke out.  He also 
presented an inmate witness’s statement that the officers 
allowed the inmates to fight.  There is ample evidence in the 
record that Martinez was present throughout the argument, 
which lasted for several minutes, before Thomas was struck.  
Thomas offered expert opinion evidence that the CCCF’s lack 
of de-escalation training, among other things, contributed to 
the serious injuries that Thomas sustained.  Similar expert 
opinion evidence was offered to preclude summary judgment 
in A.M. ex rel. J.M.K.  See 372 F.3d at 582 (“In [the expert’s] 
opinion, the Center’s failure to train its staff and follow other 
recognized standards for the operation of juvenile detention 
facilities directly contributed to the inappropriate treatment of 
A.M. while he was detained.”).  Presented with this evidence 
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and using their judgment and common sense, a reasonable 
jury could have concluded that the lack of training in conflict 
de-escalation and intervention caused Thomas’s injuries. 
IV. 
 Viewing the evidence in the record in the light most 
favorable to Thomas, we conclude that there are genuine 
issues of material fact as to whether the County exhibited 
deliberate indifference to the need for pre-service training in 
conflict de-escalation and intervention and whether the lack 
of such training bears a causal relationship to Thomas’s 
injuries.  Accordingly, we will vacate the District Court’s 
grant of summary judgment in the County’s favor so that a 
factfinder may consider these issues.  We remand the case to 
the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
